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Abstract
Our study analyses the nature, quality and extent of human resource disclosures (HRDs) of UK Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE) 100 firms by relying on a novel disclosure index measuring the depth and breadth of disclosures. Contex-
tually, we focus on the 5-year period following the then Labour government’s attempts to encourage firms to formally report 
on their human resource management practices and to foster deeper employer–employee engagement. First, we evaluate the 
degree to which companies report comprehensively (or substantively) on a number of HRD items that we classify as “pro-
cedural” or “sustainable.” Second, we hypothesise that a company’s employee relation ideology (using a proxy to measure 
a company’s level of “unitarism”) is positively associated with HRD. Our results indicate that: (i) whilst there has been an 
increase in the breadth of HRD in terms of procedural and sustainable items being disclosed, the evolution towards a more 
comprehensive and in-depth form of HRD remains rather limited; and (ii) there is a positive association between a company’s 
employee relation ideology (unitarism) and the level of HRD. Theoretically, we conceive of HRD both as a reflection of an 
organisation’s orientation towards a key stakeholder (unitarist relations with labour) and a legitimacy seeking exercise at a 
time of changing societal conditions. We contribute to the scant literature on the extent and determinants of HRD since prior 
research tends to subsume employee-related disclosures within the broader concept of social, ethical or intellectual capital 
disclosures. We also propose a disclosure checklist to underpin future HRD research.
Keywords Human resource disclosure · Employee relation ideology · Stakeholder theory · Legitimacy theory
Introduction
Whether from an economic, ethical or corporate social 
responsibility perspective, there have been recurring con-
cerns amongst government, accounting and human resource 
professional bodies, investors, civil society organisations, 
and academics on the extent to which (if at all) the contri-
bution of employees is recognised in corporate accounting 
and disclosure models (Roslender et al. 2004; Ejiogu and 
Ejiogu 2018; Bowrin 2018). In particular, the inability of 
mandatory accounting and financial reporting practice to 
address this gap has been viewed as a marginalisation of 
the firms’ employee intellectual base, and the domination of 
capital over labour interests (Bowrin, 2018; Roslender and 
Stevenson 2009; Roslender et al. 2015). Instead, some firms 
appear to have resorted to the use of voluntary and narra-
tive disclosure of employee information, albeit the evidence 
is often subsumed within broader explorations of ethical, 
intellectual capital (IC), and social disclosures (Abeysekera 
and Guthrie 2004, 2005; Lin et al. 2012; Samudhram et al. 
2014). The emphasis has mostly been on measuring HRD 
items from a dichotomous perspective (presence/absence) 
or volumetric perspective (e.g. number of words and sen-
tences), and reliance on checklists pertaining to broader 
conceptual frameworks (e.g. intellectual capital; social; 
ethical), which do not enable a richer appreciation of HRD 
information. Finally, there remains a limited understanding 
of the theoretical motivations and firm-level determinants of 
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human resource disclosure (HRD), taking into consideration 
the prevailing historical, social, and political context during 
which disclosures are made.
Our specific interest lies in the UK Labour government’s 
attempt to formalise corporate HRD practice in the mid-
2000s (Department of Trade and Industry DTI 2003a, b) 
with the Accounting for People project; which was billed as 
a significant historical call for action (Roslender and Steven-
son 2009; Roslender et al. 2015, Bowrin 2018). Although 
there was much debate over several years in relation to this 
ultimately unsuccessful policy intervention (Stittle 2004; 
Roslender and Stevenson 2009), there has not been any 
empirical study of how UK companies responded to the 
prevailing social realities brought about by the government 
at the time. Furthermore, we contend that there has been 
little attempt to examine whether a firm’s own “mindset” in 
relation to employee relations (Brown 2000; Mäkelä 2013) 
might influence the level of HRD. Specifically, we propose 
that employee relation ideology (i.e. unitarism vs. non-uni-
tarism–pluralism/radicalism) could be a helpful notion to 
appreciate which firms might be more attuned to labour/
employee interests and by extension, be more amenable to 
engage in comprehensive forms of HRD. Consequently, we 
formulate the following research questions: (i) what has been 
UK firms’ disposition towards comprehensive forms of HRD 
following the 2003 Labour government’s attempts to foster 
more corporate accountability? and (ii) to what extent does 
the firm’s employee relation ideology influence the nature 
and comprehensiveness of HRD in the presence of other 
firm-specific and corporate governance characteristics?
Our research questions are motivated by two contempo-
rary developments. First, there have been recent calls for 
evidence on HRD from professional bodies, such as the 
UK Chartered Institute of Personnel Development (CIPD). 
Their calls have also arisen out of the need to explore issues, 
including how to “count the uncountables” (i.e. people) 
(Hesketh 2013) and how the visibility of human “capi-
tal” can be improved and better reported in annual reports 
(CIPD 2015). An understanding of how and why disclosures 
evolved or not under previous calls for reform would provide 
a useful reference point for any more recent empirical explo-
rations. Relatedly, Bowrin (2018) recently examines the case 
of HRDs, but these largely focus on cross-country, rather 
than firm-level, determinants (e.g. national governance and 
foreign influence) for companies operating in several Afri-
can and Caribbean countries.
Secondly, and as highlighted previously, a few studies 
(e.g. Abeysekera and Guthrie 2004, 2005; Abeysekera 2008; 
Bowrin 2018) have examined some facets of HRDs, but 
these are often subsumed within broader (and arguably more 
shareholder wealth-centric) concepts, such as IC reporting 
(Abeysekera and Guthrie 2004; Abhayawansa and Abey-
sekera 2008). Furthermore, social and/or environmental 
studies have begun to focus on the “comprehensiveness” 
or “substantiveness” of the information (e.g. Bouten et al. 
2011; Soobaroyen and Ntim 2013); which can enable eco-
nomic and social stakeholders to make a more informed 
judgement of a company’s aims/commitment, activities, and 
performance in relation to a particular theme (Sepasi et al. 
2018). All too often, however, disclosure can be perfunctory 
and selective in nature, raising not only ethical concerns as 
to the intentions of the organisation in its communication 
with stakeholders, but also functional limitations in terms of 
the information’s usefulness. Hence, an empirical research 
design to investigate HRD should consider how comprehen-
sive and substantive HRDs actually are.
We adopt a relatively novel approach to measure the 
depth and breadth of disclosure, and hence the compre-
hensiveness, of HRD. The disclosure index also ascertains 
HRDs over two dimensions; namely, (a) the theme of HRD 
(informed by previous empirical studies) (Abeysekera 2008; 
Ax and Marton 2008; Subbarao and Zeghal 1997), and (b) 
the level of comprehensiveness in the disclosure measured as 
(i) objectives, (ii) measurements, (iii) targets, (iv) initiatives, 
and (v) achievements. This approach expands Bouten et al.’s 
(2011) work on a comprehensive reporting model, which 
has three information types per theme, namely, “vision and 
goals,” “management approach”, and “performance indica-
tor.” Finally, we classify 22 HRD items into two categories: 
those that can be seen as a reflection of (i) sustainable (long-
term) HR-related investment, or (ii) procedural (short-term 
or more routine) aspects of HR practice.
Theoretically, our study firstly draws on the stakeholder 
and legitimacy perspectives to frame why large corporations 
voluntarily disclose information relating to their employees 
(Chen and Roberts 2010; Su 2014). Whilst these theories 
are often seen as distinct in relation to their different disci-
plinary origins, they collectively provide an understanding 
of the diverse role of communication and disclosure in the 
interactions between the organisation and its environment, 
whether “environment” refers to particular interest groups 
(e.g. employees) or more broadly to “society,” in terms of 
the norms, expectations and values that it reflects (Mahadeo 
et al. 2011; Soobaroyen and Ntim 2013). Furthermore, given 
the specificity of the stakeholders in our study, we provide 
a further grounding of this theoretical framework by draw-
ing from the concept of stakeholder salience (Mitchell et al. 
1997) and employee relation ideologies (Brown 2000) to 
argue that an organisational/managerial intention towards 
developing a common and mutual objective with employees/
labour is consistent with a unitarist ideology, which in turn 
will be associated to more comprehensive forms of HRD. 
Moreover, we bring forward the concept of moral legitimacy 
(Suchman 1995; Mahadeo et al. 2011) to conceptualise 
changes in organisational disclosures in response to soci-
etal (including political) attitudes about the need for more 
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corporate accountability towards labour interests. Hence, 
distinct from previous studies, the theoretical framework that 
we employ seeks to analyse the nature (themes and catego-
risations) of HRD information, its comprehensiveness over 
the period of analysis in response to societal changes and the 
association between HRD and the extent of the company’s 
perceived affiliation to unitarist (non-unitarist) principles.
The paper contributes to the literature in the following 
ways. First, it provides contextually-informed longitudinal 
evidence of HRD practices; and in particular reveals that 
there is a significant improvement in HRD over the study 
period, especially in terms of sustainable HRD, such as 
employee involvement and training. Results further reveal 
that procedural HRD items are generally disclosed at the 
symbolic level, and that there is a positive association 
between a unitarist employee relation ideology and corpo-
rate HRD. Secondly, and inspired by prior work consider-
ing the comprehensiveness of social and environmental 
disclosure (e.g. Bouten et al., 2011) and the substantive and 
symbolic characterisation of disclosure (Day and Woodward 
2004; Soobaroyen and Ntim 2013; Michelon et al. 2015), 
our disclosure index provides a comprehensive methodo-
logical tool to assess HRD practice. In particular, it is suf-
ficiently detailed and distinct from the mainstream notion 
of IC to be more appropriate to assess a firm’s disposition 
towards HRD. Furthermore, as opposed to previous studies 
(McCracken et al. 2018), our approach to capture the depth 
of reporting extends the currently available tools and helps 
the reader to assess the substantive/comprehensive or selec-
tive/symbolic nature of HRD. Finally, our study draws from 
Brown’s work (2000) to propose a firm-level variable—the 
extent of the organisation’s unitarist orientation—as a proxy 
for a company’s employee relation ideology.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. sec-
tion “HRD: Previous Research, Theory and Hypotheses” 
reviews the extant HR disclosure literature and the UK set-
ting leading to the theoretical underpinning and hypotheses 
development, while section “Data and methods” sets out 
the methodology. The analysis and findings are reported 
in section Data analysis and results. The discussion is pre-
sented in section “Discussion”, followed by the conclusion 
in section “Conclusion”, including the ethical implications 
of organisational disclosure.
HRD: Previous Research, Theory 
and Hypotheses
The research agenda on IC disclosure has generated a notable 
body of work on the extent of disclosures or narratives incorpo-
rating various aspects of “human capital” (HC) in a number of 
contexts, mainly on the grounds that such information is mar-
ket-sensitive (Abhayawansa and Abeysekera 2008; Cuganesan 
2006; Lin et al. 2012; Samagaio and Rodrigues 2016). Never-
theless, the extent of IC disclosure has been found to be gener-
ally low or fluctuating considerably; with some attention paid 
to HC reporting more recently (McCracken et al. 2018) that is 
suggestive of stakeholder-led motivations rather than market-
led ones. Yet, contextual analyses of HRD remain few and far 
between, and there has been little emphasis on organisation-
level variables that may explain decisions to engage in more 
comprehensive or selective forms of disclosure.
Methodologically, many of the above-mentioned stud-
ies rely on dichotomous approaches to measure corporate 
disclosures (Barako et al. 2006; Roberts 1992), and argu-
ably, this approach does not capture how comprehensive the 
disclosed information is (Roslender and Dyson 1992; Win-
termantel and Mattimore 1997). For example, McCracken 
et al. (2018) recently conducted a study of the UK FTSE 
100 companies and found a resurgence of interest in HRD. 
However, the conclusions are based on a volumetric disclo-
sure analysis (sentence counts). Furthermore, whilst their 
findings revealed that the HRD practice has increased over 
the period of analysis, the authors offered limited theoretical 
explanation and arguments for the observable improvement 
in practice. Moreover, very little has emerged to-date in 
terms of detailed cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence 
(McCracken et al. 2018; Roslender and Stevenson 2009; 
Roslender et al. 2004, 2015).
Overall therefore, the empirical work on HRD can be pro-
filed as: (i) largely descriptive accounts of disclosures (e.g. 
Abeysekera 2008) with limited theoretical underpinnings; 
(ii) explanatory studies limited to general firm-level deter-
minants (e.g. firm size and industry); and (iii) theoretically 
informed studies with broader set of explanatory variables, 
such as governance and culture (e.g. Li et al. 2008, 2012; 
Bowrin 2018). In this third category of studies, however, 
there has been an emphasis on IC disclosures rather than on 
HRD per se. Hence, the above-mentioned gaps provide the 
motivation for our study.
HRD Frameworks and Reforms in the UK Corporate 
Setting
There have been several exhortations to improve the prac-
tice of accounting for HR since its formal inception in the 
UK in the 1970s (AAA 1973; Day and Woodward 2004; 
McCracken et al. 2018). Some of these initiatives influenced 
regulatory frameworks and legislation (i.e. Companies Act 
1985; Employment Act 1982; Employment Protection Act 
1975; Companies Act 2006). Following the election of a 
Labour government in 1997, policy initiatives relating to 
HC management practices resurfaced in the early and mid-
2000s (DTI 2003a, b) and fostered a lively debate. Among 
these, the Accounting for People initiative introduced by the 
UK government in January 2003 was seen to be a concerted 
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effort to formalise a corporate practice of accounting for HR, 
thus recognising labour as a key stakeholder.
In January 2003, the UK government announced a task-
force on HC management, which completed the Accounting 
for People report in November of the same year. In par-
ticular, the report highlighted the possibility of accounting 
for people by UK firms, particularly for large quoted public 
firms (DTI 2003a, b). Initiatives to account for people took 
place in parallel with efforts to mandate the Operational and 
Financial Review (OFR) for UK listed firms; it was proposed 
that the OFR would be taken as the platform to account for 
HR as well. In January 2005, draft legislation on reform-
ing company reporting of employees went to Parliament, 
and was legally enacted in March 2005. According to the 
legislation, the provision of HR information as a part of the 
OFR became a statutory requirement for large UK-quoted 
companies with the financial year commencing April 1, 
2005. Surprisingly, by November 2005, the requirement to 
compile an OFR (inclusive of the legal obligation for UK 
firms to disclose information relating to their employees) 
was abandoned. The UK accounting profession was seen 
to have effectively lobbied against the proposed initiatives, 
leading to academic criticisms (Roslender and Stevenson 
2009; Roslender et al. 2004, 2015), and impacting changes 
in corporate HRD practice over time. A corporate reluc-
tance to engage with employee-related disclosures has been 
previously noted. For example, Day and Woodward (2004) 
revealed that firms disregarded even the statutory minimum 
disclosure requirements. Interestingly, the legal sanctions, 
which would have been applicable for such non-compliance, 
did not appear to be enforced, possibly indicating a lack of 
interest from firms, enforcement agencies, and/or limited 
market-led monitoring mechanisms. In conclusion, there has 
been little in the way of empirical analysis to study HRD 
following such key events. We now consider the theoretical 
framing of our study.
HRD, Stakeholder Salience and the Pursuit of Moral 
Legitimacy
Firstly, stakeholder theory underlines the role of internal 
and external actors and the influence these actors may 
have on firms as a result of their financial or non-financial 
interest(s) (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Jensen 2002). 
In this regard, stakeholder theory has been relied upon to 
explain the reporting of social practices reflecting the infor-
mational needs of multiple stakeholder groups (Bouten et al. 
2011; Pedrini 2007; Roberts 1992). Faced with demands for 
accountability in relation to these interests, the ethical vari-
ant of stakeholder theory suggests that organisations need 
to unilaterally address these demands, however multiple 
they might be, and are expected to adopt comprehensive, 
substantive HRD practices to reflect these accountability 
relationships. A different, and arguably more common, per-
spective is the instrumental variant of stakeholder theory, 
whereby a firm seeks to manage and placate stakeholder 
concerns by relying on a blend of substantive and symbolic 
information—in effect a more strategic approach in the map-
ping of the relationship between organisation and stakehold-
ers (Soobaroyen and Ntim 2013). The power, legitimacy, and 
urgency characteristics of the target stakeholders guide dis-
closure priorities in order to ensure a strategic form of stake-
holder management (Clement 2005; Mitchell et al. 1997). 
For example, Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that stakeholders 
that are more legitimate and powerful and have urgent con-
cerns will require more corporate attention and disclosure. 
Hence, from an instrumental perspective, stakeholder theory 
underpins a need to prioritise communication to target the 
specific audiences that are more likely to impact a firm’s 
ability to maintain and sustain its activities. As previously 
argued by Soobaroyen and Ntim (2013), a strategic approach 
to organisational disclosure can involve a combination of 
substantive and symbolic information, since even symbolic 
displays of commitment may be sufficient to manage stake-
holder interests in given contexts and circumstances. At the 
same time, a perceived or actual change in stakeholder sali-
ence may lead to a variation in the nature of the disclosures. 
Specifically, the decision by the UK government to endorse 
and foster the Accounting for People project can be seen 
as a change in the salience of a given stakeholder (labour/
employees), and can bring out a corporate response.
Therefore, it may be argued that organisations may sub-
stantively engage in practices and initiatives to bring about 
genuine change in employee/labour conditions (sustainable 
HR) together with meeting HR procedures and processes 
(procedural HR), as is reflected in a comprehensive or sub-
stantive form of HRD. Alternatively, organisations may par-
tially adopt practices and/or emphasise procedural matters 
without bringing about any meaningful change. A selective 
form of HRD may thus be observed, which would reflect a 
symbolic acknowledgement of employee/labour interests.
Secondly, in line with the legitimacy argument (Chen 
and Roberts 2010), firms voluntarily disclose or withhold 
information because they assume such communication 
is relevant and important to legitimise their actions and 
dispositions towards societal norms and values. Thus, 
firms seek to legitimise their continued survival by taking 
desired actions or by appearing to take desired actions 
(Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005; Ehnert et al. 2016). In 
so doing, the communication of an affinity with, and/or 
adherence to, the expectations of wider society in terms 
of how employees should be treated by their employers 
reflects an organisational aspiration to be doing the “right 
thing.” Suchman (1995, p. 578) refers to this as the pur-
suit of “moral legitimacy” whereby the emphasis is not 
on whether a given practice (HRD) will benefit a given 
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external evaluator (employee/labour), but whether the 
activity is seen to be appropriate to promote societal wel-
fare (Mahadeo et al. 2011).
In this respect, and informed by Suchman (1995), moral 
legitimacy can be evaluated from two perspectives: “conse-
quential” (e.g. disclosures may refer to social outcomes) and 
“processual” (e.g. disclosures outline use of procedures). 
Within the moral legitimacy perspective, disclosures could 
be of any form or content (whether comprehensive or selec-
tive) since even symbolic displays of commitment may 
be sufficient to secure legitimacy. Soobaroyen and Ntim 
(2013) contend that more detailed forms of reporting may 
be required if a particular issue involving the organisation 
has become pressing from a societal perspective (e.g. rights 
of employees, tax evasion).
Finally, one needs to consider that societal expectations 
are automatically sympathetic to labour priorities; for exam-
ple, the US context privileges flexibility in labour relations, 
which offers firms in the US the ability to hire and fire with 
minimum regulatory oversight. Contrastingly, the deci-
sion of the then Labour-led UK government to endorse an 
Accounting for People report suggests a change of political 
view and policy, which could also be seen as a change in 
societal expectations to which organisations respond through 
the communication of HRD.
Considering the depth of disclosure in the annual reports, 
HRD may vary from the selection of information presented 
symbolically to convey an impression, to a very compre-
hensive analysis of information. In terms of the breadth of 
HRD items contained in our disclosure index, we therefore 
consider a continuum along which some items are inherently 
more related to long-term/sustainable HR investment, while 
others are naturally more procedural in orientation, focusing 
on HR practices, processes and systems. The breadth and 
depth of the categories are illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2.
Relying on the stakeholder and the legitimacy arguments, 
and on the context underlying the UK debate over the recog-
nition of the role and contribution of labour/employees dur-
ing the mid-2000s, we argue that UK firms will be expected 
to engage in more comprehensive and substantive forms of 
disclosure following the attempted reforms. This leads us to 
the first hypothesis:
H1 HRDs are more likely to be increasingly substantive and 
comprehensive from 2005 to 2009.
Organisational Ideologies of Employee Relations 
as a Determinant of HRDs
Whilst the stakeholder and legitimacy framework outlined 
above can contribute to an explanation of trends in the dif-
ferent types of HRD over time in a given context, they are 
somewhat limited in terms of explaining variations between 
companies within the same context. In this respect, the lit-
erature already provides for a number of mainstream firm-
level variables (e.g. size, industry and governance structure), 
which seek to reflect general managerial intentions or orien-
tations towards a given social practice or behaviour (Barako 
et al. 2006; Abeysekera 2010). For example, the presence 
and/or prevalence of independent directors on the board has 
been associated to a greater extent of social responsibility 
disclosures, due to the influence they may have on the organ-
isation’s strategy and approach towards social stakeholders 
(Barako et al. 2006), and, hence in terms of their ability to 
influence managerial intentions. In our case however, we 
extend this consideration of managerial orientations towards 
Fig. 1  The interpretive frame-
work: comprehensiveness of the 
disclosures
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labour by drawing upon Brown’s (2000) work on the typol-
ogy of employee relations ideologies: namely “unitarist,” 
“pluralist,” and “radical” forms. An understanding of using 
these ideologies to explain how/why certain information and 
disclosures are communicated to different stakeholders has 
only recently emerged in the literature (Mäkelä 2013).
Firstly, within a “unitarist” ideological environment, 
employees/labour and management/owners tends to have 
common and mutual objectives that are subsequently pur-
sued in a friendly and supportive environment for HC man-
agement and disclosure (Brown 2000). In this scenario, 
HRD tends to take a more comprehensive or substantive 
form, and in recognition of the ethical variant of stakeholder 
theory, communication is viewed as a means to improve 
work relations by “…reducing conflict, overcoming sus-
picion and promoting greater harmony in the workplace” 
(Smith 1985, p. 1).
By contrast, in a “non-unitarist” (pluralist/radical) ideologi-
cal environment, the relationships between labour, manage-
ment, and to some extent, capital providers, with regards to 
the central objectives of a firm, tend to be antagonistic and 
confrontational as a result of divergences in their expecta-
tions relating to HR investments, management, and disclo-
sure. According to Brown (2000, p. 51), such conflict is based 
on genuinely different interests. Disclosure becomes part of 
a conflictual accountability process between the firm and its 
staff, and underpins negotiations between the parties. In this 
case, and confronted with these pressures, we argue that HRDs 
are likely to be more selective in orientation, and symbolic 
at times (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990), reflecting the degree of 
conflict amongst the key corporate actors. At the other end 
of the spectrum, the radical perspective draws on the Marx-
ist argument of labour exploitation and why/how companies 
extract the surplus value from labour to generate more profit; 
employers are more powerful and have more authority over 
employees. In this context, corporate disclosure is reflective of 
a capitalist logic and employee representatives are inherently 
suspicious of engaging with the assumptions, language and 
discourses underlying HRD.
In a corporate context where a unitarist ideology under-
pins a firm’s managerial intentions, we argue that the firm pro-
vides a more explicit position on industrial relation practices, 
including union activities. In contrast, an inherent antagonistic 
relationship in a non-unitarist environment implies that disclo-
sures relating to industrial relations and union activities are 
less likely to be comprehensive and consistent in terms of their 
information content, reflecting apparent divergences from the 
expectations of the key stakeholders. Since pluralist/radicalist 
ideologies are associated with a state of disagreement between 
employee unions/labour and management/owners, we classify 
these concepts as a non-unitarist (i.e. pluralist/radicalist) ideol-
ogy of employee relations. Therefore, we contend that a dis-
closure with a comprehensive coverage of HRD information 
would be consistent with a unitarist employee relation ideol-
ogy. In contrast, a non-unitarist (pluralist/radicalist) employee 
relation ideology will be associated with a more selective and 
symbolic form of reporting. This leads to the second research 
hypothesis:
H2 The more unitarist the company’s employee relation 
ideology is, the more comprehensive (or substantive) the 
HRDs are likely to be.
Data and Methods
Research Strategy, Data and Sampling
Content analysis has been a very common strategy in codi-
fying and analysing voluntary disclosure practices in firms’ 
Fig. 2  The interpretive frame-
work: depth of the disclosures
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annual reports, such as accounting for IC (Li et al. 2008), 
corporate governance (Armstrong et al. 2010; Barako et al. 
2006), HRD (Beattie and Smith 2010; Cormier et al. 2009), 
and corporate social responsibility (Bouten et al. 2011; Rob-
erts 1992; Vuontisjärvi 2006). We adopt a similar strategy 
for our study of HRD practices by UK FTSE100 firms.
In order to identify if/how a firms’ disposition towards 
HRD changed following the UK government’s attempts 
to encourage more human resource-related information, 
a 5-year time span (from 2005 to 2009) was considered. 
Moreover, relying on FTSE100 firms’ annual reports from 
2005 ensured that we would observe disclosures from the 
period when international financial reporting standards 
(IFRS) became mandatory in the UK and the European 
Union. The sample period also covers the period the Labour 
government was in power, given that it lost to a coalition of 
the Conservative and Liberal democrat parties in the 2010 
elections, signalling a notable change in political priorities. 
Similarly, the period of analysis does not address the effects 
of the introduction of the UK corporate governance code 
(Financial Reporting Council 2010, 2012), since it would 
have had an impact on reporting practices involving employ-
ees, as one of the major corporate stakeholders. The sample 
of annual reports was limited to 210 annual reports that met 
the required data, covering a 5-year time period (2009—49; 
2008—46; 2007—40; 2006—40 and 2005—35). One limi-
tation of the sample selection technique is the possibility 
of self-selection bias. The sample, however, accounts for a 
minimum of 26% to a maximum of 36% of the total market 
capitalization of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(34–44% of all the FTSE 100 firms) for the sample period. 
This arguably minimises the possibility of sample selection 
bias.
Data Collection and content analysis
To-date, different types of units of measurement have been 
used in content analysis. These include counts of: words 
(Li et al. 2008; Subbarao and Zeghal 1997); lines (Abey-
sekera and Guthrie 2004, 2005); sentences (Abeysekera 
and Guthrie 2004); and paragraphs (Guthrie et al. 2004). 
Previous studies have primarily considered the presence or 
absence of information, frequency of reporting, text size 
(Abeysekera and Guthrie 2004, 2005; Subbarao and Zeghal 
1997), and coverage in terms of breadth (Beattie 2005) of 
reporting. Very few studies, though, have considered the 
“depth” of reporting (Bouten et al. 2011), and this has long 
been recognised a limitation within the literature (Michelon 
et al. 2015). This is akin to Michelon et al.’s (2015) idea of 
inferring “managerial orientation” (towards corporate social 
responsibility) from disclosure data.
Informed by these HRD studies (Abeysekera 2008; Abey-
sekera and Guthrie 2004, 2005; Ax and Marton 2008; Huang 
et al. 2013; Subbarao and Zeghal 1997), disclosure themes 
have been selected and validated via a pilot study of a sample 
of UK annual reports (20 reports each from 2008 and 2009) 
prior to the main data collection exercise. A pilot study, 
which started with a broader list of items (39), helped refine 
the final disclosure index to a 22-item list. This was done 
through an iterative process of classifying and re-classifying 
items in order to develop the current HRD index, inclusive 
of its two categories, “sustainable” and “procedural” HRD. 
The HRD for a particular item is then measured in terms of 
its presence and absence (1 and 0, respectively), followed 
by an assessment of the informational availability of HRD 
items at each level of reporting. Briefly, “objective” refers 
to the availability of disclosures related to the objectives 
under each individual HRD item (e.g. our plan is to increase 
employees’ engagement). “Measurement” refers to the avail-
ability of disclosures related to measurement criteria to 
assess under each item (e.g. employee engagement score). 
“Target” refers to the availability of information regarding 
the periodic targets under each HRD item (e.g. increase the 
employee engagement score by 5% during the year). “Ini-
tiative” refers to the availability of disclosures related to 
the action plans under each HRD item (e.g. organise work-
shops and training programmes to reinforce and encourage 
employee engagement). Finally, “achievement” refers to the 
availability of disclosures related to the periodic achieve-
ment of the targets under each HRD item or related out-
comes (e.g. this enables the firm to engage employees to 
deliver to customers and to increase business performance).
Hence, the disclosure score under each HRD item can 
vary from 0 (no disclosure) up to 5 (comprehensive overall 
disclosure integrating all the five levels). A comprehensive 
disclosure (score of 5) for any item in the HRD index reflects 
the substantive nature of the information, thereby allowing 
stakeholders and other societal actors to make an informed 
judgement on the nature of a firm’s HR practices (Marr et al. 
2004).
Research Model and Measures
The first research hypothesis is investigated via a descrip-
tive/trend analysis. The second research hypothesis consists 
of examining the relationship between the firm’s employee 
relation ideology and HRD using multiple regression analy-
sis. Key variables and the measurements used in the model 
are provided in Table 10 in Appendix.
Dependent Variable
HRD index data was collected manually via content analy-
sis techniques. In addition to the overall disclosure index 
(HRD), we have considered two sub-indices in relation to 
the nature of the disclosure: whether the items are related to 
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long-term human resource investment (sustainable HR) or 
short-term procedural-related disclosures.
Independent Variable
The independent variable—unitarist or non-unitarist ori-
entation of the firm—is assessed by relying on Brown’s 
(2000) employee relations ideologies. Specifically, the firm’s 
disposition towards a given employee relation ideology is 
assessed (from 0 to 5) on the basis of the firm’s disclosure 
of its relationship with employee representatives and union 
activities. This is akin to Michelon et al.’s (2015) idea of 
inferring “managerial orientation” from disclosure data. A 
more detailed explanation of how the company addresses 
employee and union relations will lead to a higher score and 
thereby reflect a trend towards a unitarist ideology. A lower 
score (or zero) would, respectively, proxy for a low unitarism 
or a non-unitarist ideology.
Control Variables
Relying on prior studies of voluntary disclosure generally, 
and HRD more specifically, legitimacy and stakeholder per-
spectives underpin the implications of firm-specific charac-
teristics: firm size (Kadapakkam et al. 1998), IC intensity 
(Amir and Lev 1996; Li et al. 2012), industry regulation 
(Lajili and Zéghal 2005, 2006), leverage (Popov 2014), 
profitability (An et al. 2011), liquidity (Kadapakkam et al. 
1998), and employee productivity, and corporate govern-
ance variables: board size (Abeysekera 2010), board inde-
pendence (Li et al. 2012), size and the number of meetings 
of the audit, and remuneration and nomination committees 
(Cormier et al. 2009). These are hypothesised as control 
variables for the model investigating the association between 
the employee relation ideologies and HRD. Financial and 
governance related variables are collected from annual 
reports or from the FAME (Bureau Van Dijk) database and 
described in Table 10 in Appendix.
Research Model
The multiple regression analysis to test the second research 
hypothesis takes the form of Eq. 1 illustrated below.
where HRD, human resource disclosure index; ER, 
employee relation ideology; FV, firm-specific control vari-
ables; CG, corporate governance variables; β0, constant; β1, 
βi, βj, regression coefficients; εt, residual value.
(1)HRDt = 훽0 + 훽1ER +
n∑
i=0
훽iFVi +
n∑
j=0
훽jCGj + 휀t
Data Analysis and Results
The data analyses include description of the research sam-
ple, descriptive analysis assessing the firm-level HRD to 
test the first research hypothesis, and multiple regres-
sion analyses testing for the second research hypothesis. 
Table 1 provides the results of the descriptive statistics.
HRD by FTSE 100 Firms
The initial analyses focus on the firms’ disposition toward 
HRD in FTSE 100 firms in terms of: (i) percentage of 
firms that disclose any information in relation to each of 
the HRD items measured for each financial year and for 
the overall sample (Table 2); (ii) mean disclosure score for 
individual HRD items for each financial year and for the 
overall sample (Table 3); and (iii) percentage of firms that 
substantively report for each HRD item, in which case only 
the firms that report on all five levels or at least 4 levels 
would qualify as being engaged in substantive reporting 
(Table 4). Results illustrated in Table 2 reveal that each 
and every item considered under the disclosure index was 
seen to be important, albeit to varying extents. The per-
centage of firms that disclosed the various HRD items over 
the period appears to be very high and is relatively stable.
Items such as work environment and culture, employee 
know-how and competency, human resource section and 
function, employee numbers, employee appreciation, 
employee involvement, and employee experience were the 
most popular items to be disclosed by the firms (i.e. all the 
firms disclosed these items on several occasions). Value 
added and revenue per employee and HR director commit-
tee were the least popular HRD items since less than 50% 
of the firms disclosed information on these two aspects.
Furthermore, according to the mean HRD scores over 
the period (Table  3), both sustainable and procedural 
HRD increased over time. The majority of most disclosed 
items related to sustainable HRD (i.e. work environment 
and culture, employee involvement and engagement, 
employee training programmes, and employee expenses 
and pension). The most reported procedural HRD was on 
employee numbers, and employee health and safety. Most 
of the least disclosed items, such as HR director commit-
tee, employee motivation, and employee featured, related 
to procedural HRD. Value added or revenue per employee 
was the least disclosed of all the items. Clearly, however, 
in terms of the quality of the reported information, more 
significant variations can be noticed.
In determining the substantive or symbolic nature of the 
disclosures (Table 4), only two items (health & safety and 
employee/involvement engagement) could be classified as 
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comprehensive and even in such cases, this only applied to 
55% of the surveyed reports. Figure 3 presents a compara-
tive picture of the HRD index (HR sustainable-related and 
Procedural HRD), presenting HRD items with the high-
est to lowest mean disclosure values and the highest to 
lowest percentage of firms substantively reporting under 
each HRD item. The most reported HRD items in terms 
of the mean disclosure value are similar to those compre-
hensively disclosed by a large number of companies. The 
HRD items, which are higher in terms of the mean dis-
closure value as well as substantively reported by a large 
number of firms, are items related to long-term HR invest-
ment, with only a few exceptions (Fig. 3). In effect, at the 
dichotomous measurement stage, HRD practices appear 
quite frequently across the sample. However, over time 
and once the depth of disclosure was considered, more 
selectivity emerged from the disclosures.
Procedural HRD items mostly relate to the categories 
least reported in terms of the mean HRD value and were 
substantively disclosed by the least number of firms, indi-
cating that more firms appeared to be involved in a selec-
tive disclosure strategy. Several procedural HRD items, 
such as employee health and safety, and employee diversity 
and equity, accounted for a larger part of the mean HRD 
score, reflecting the considerable attention of stakeholders 
and societal actors on health and safety, and a processual 
form of moral legitimacy. For certain HRD items, such as 
value added or revenue per employee and employee expe-
rience, selective or non-disclosure was relatively frequent 
and reflective of a strategy to not reveal the more finan-
cial-led metrics of employee contributions (e.g. comparing 
value-added to average salaries in the company) (Amir and 
Lev 1996). In other words, there are indications of a more 
instrumental form of stakeholder management and moral 
legitimacy seeking practices than of a more ethically driven 
notion of accountability to stakeholders.
HRD Trend in the UK Context
As evidence of the corporate response to regulatory attempts 
by the then Labour government, our results show a clear 
increase in the number of firms that started to disclose infor-
mation relating to our HRD items between 2005 and 2006, 
except for two notable items (HR director committee and 
value added/revenue per employee). The drops in disclo-
sure in 2007 and 2008 might have been attributable to the 
Table 1  Sample description and descriptive statistics
Firm size is measured as the natural log of market capitalization in £ millions; firm leverage is the ratio between total debt to total equity; firm 
profitability is measured as the return on equity percentage; the intellectual capital intensity is measured as the value added per human capital 
or the ratio between the total value added and the human resource expenditure; and employee productivity is the ratio between the net income 
before minority interest divided by the number of employees
Variable in the model Mean Standard deviation Median Skewness Kurtosis
Firm characteristics
 Firm size (£Mn) 26,954.36 29,199.92 16,920.04 1.99 6.32
 Firm leverage (ratio) 9.18 15.34 2.460 1.79 6.71
 Firm profitability (%) 30.98 27.59 27.22 0.04 7.11
 Firm liquidity (ratio) 0.85 0.58 0.76 2.66 13.89
 Value added per human capital (ratio) 3.44 3.02 2.80 4.36 28.10
 Employee productivity (ratio) 0.06 0.10 0.03 3.03 13.57
Corporate governance variables
 Board size (no.) 12.98 2.58 13.00 0.44 3.60
 Audit committee size (no.) 4.51 1.09 4.00 0.55 3.00
 Nomination committee size (no.) 5.41 1.98 5.00 0.67 2.60
 Remuneration committee size (no.) 4.56 1.10 5.00 0.36 2.78
 Board independence (ratio) 0.71 0.10 0.71 − 0.11 2.41
 Audit committee meetings (no.) 5.82 2.42 5.00 1.33 4.41
 Remuneration committee meetings (no.) 5.60 2.21 5.00 1.01 4.44
 Nomination committee meetings (no.) 3.74 2.23 3.00 1.35 6.19
Employee relation ideology
 Unitarist employee relation 1.84 1.58 2.00 0.55 2.32
Disclosure variables
 Human resource disclosure 0.59 0.15 0.58 − 0.19 2.49
 Procedural HRD 0.56 0.14 0.58 − 0.23 2.65
 Sustainable HRD 0.61 0.17 0.62 − 0.26 2.34
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unfavourable economic conditions arising from the financial 
crisis. There was a generally corresponding increase in pro-
cedural and sustainable HRD, indicative of an increase in 
the breadth of disclosure as well. According to the annual 
averages presented in Table 5, with the exception of 2008, 
on average, the HRD indices have increased over the period, 
albeit marginally. This can be seen as an attempt to respond 
to stakeholder and government-led demands to engage with 
the Accounting for People agenda, and is in accordance with 
the stakeholder salience and moral legitimacy perspectives 
(Abeysekera 2008; Abeysekera and Guthrie 2004, 2005; Ax 
and Marton 2008; McCracken et al. 2018).
The overall HRD index revealed an increasing trend in 
terms of the amount disclosed. This indicates that the UK’s 
policy attempts to formally recognise human resources has 
had a positive, albeit selective, impact on some aspects of 
HRD in the annual reports. In addition, the eventual failure 
of the government’s attempts to formalise an HRD frame-
work could have signalled to UK firms that such disclosure 
has become less important and/or societal attention has 
shifted. Similar organisational responses were noted in the 
case of Soobaroyen and Ntim (2013). Over the period under 
study however, it can be concluded that the nature of the 
disclosures has gradually shifted from a selective form to a 
more comprehensive one, and more substantive information 
is disclosed in the annual reports (Marr et al. 2004), thereby 
supporting H1, and reflecting stakeholder salience and 
moral legitimacy perspectives. In particular, the existence 
of more substantive information in relation to sustainable 
HRD suggests that there has been a change in the salience 
of the stakeholder arising from the government’s disposition 
towards HR reforms. At the same time, organisational vari-
ations do exist, and the next section attempts to explain this 
changing behaviour by considering the relationship between 
the company’s employee relation ideology and HRD.
Employee Relation Ideology and Substantive 
Disclosure
A complete set of regression diagnostics was performed 
before hypothesis testing. The correlation matrix is pre-
sented in Table 6. All the financial variables are winsorized 
Table 2  Percentage of firms disclosing any information in relation to the individual HRD items measured for each financial year and for the 
overall sample
Disclosure item %HRD
2005
%HRD
2006
%HRD
2007
%HRD
2008
%HRD
2009
%HRD
Total sample
Out of 35 Out of 40 Out of 40 Out of 46 Out of 49 Out of 210
Procedural HRD
 Employee health and safety 91.43 92.50 95.00 95.65 91.84 93.33
 Employee diversity and equity issues 91.43 95.00 92.50 89.13 93.88 92.38
 HR section and HR functions 97.14 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.52
 Employee numbers 97.14 100.00 97.50 100.00 97.96 98.57
 Employee welfare and benefit 82.86 95.00 95.00 93.48 97.96 93.33
 Employee appreciation 94.29 100.00 100.00 100.00 97.96 98.57
 Employee satisfaction and loyalty 85.71 97.50 92.50 86.96 95.92 91.90
 Employee motivation 80.00 90.00 80.00 82.61 85.71 83.81
 Employee featured 88.57 82.50 80.00 89.13 89.80 86.19
 HR director committee 31.43 37.50 47.50 56.52 57.14 47.14
Sustainable HRD
 Employee involvement 88.57 97.50 100.00 97.83 93.88 95.71
 Work environment and culture of employees 100.00 97.50 97.50 100.00 100.00 99.05
 Employee expenses and pension 85.71 95.00 87.50 95.65 97.96 92.86
 Employee training programme 97.14 87.50 95.00 91.30 95.92 93.33
 Employee compensation plan including share schemes 88.57 97.50 95.00 91.30 91.84 92.86
 Employee know-how and competency 97.14 97.50 100.00 97.83 100.00 98.57
 Education and vocational qualification 77.14 80.00 80.00 71.74 73.47 76.19
 Employee experience 94.29 95.00 92.50 95.65 100.00 95.71
 Value-added strategy 94.29 97.50 95.00 97.83 97.96 96.67
 Career development 88.57 97.50 97.50 93.48 95.92 94.76
 Value-added/revenue per employee 25.71 30.00 22.50 23.91 22.45 24.76
 Entrepreneurial spirit and innovation 85.71 85.00 95.00 84.78 89.80 88.10
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at the 1st and 99th percentile in order to minimise the effect 
of possible outliers. Results of the multiple linear regression 
to test for H2 are summarised in Table 7. The main analysis 
takes into account the year and the firm fixed-effects. Results 
for the robustness check with random-effects model and the 
pooled-linear regression are presented in Tables 8 and 9, 
respectively.
According to the results reported in Table 6, there is a 
strong positive association between the extent of the uni-
tarist employee relation ideology of the firm and the level 
of HRD. The results also hold for categorical HRD indices 
for procedural and sustainable HRDs. This implies that H2 
is supported, and thus offers new insight in terms of how a 
firm’s managerial orientation towards a unitarist employee 
relations ideology can motivate more substantive and com-
prehensive disclosures. As per our theoretical expecta-
tions, an environment that is characterised by both mutual 
dialogue, respect, and trust between management/owners 
and employee unions/labour (Brown 2000), and agreement 
on common objectives results in management being more 
likely to engage HRDs that are substantive in nature. The 
firm-specific and the corporate governance related control 
variables used in previous empirical studies explaining the 
non-financial disclosure in general, however, did not reveal 
any significant association with HRD when firm- and year-
fixed-effects were accounted for. This suggests that HRD, 
compared to other social and environmental disclosures, 
is less (if at all) influenced by traditional organisational 
factors. However, when relying on a random-effects model 
and pooled-linear regressions, the firm-specific variables 
(firm size, liquidity, and profitability), governance related 
control variables (board independence, remuneration com-
mittee size, and nomination committee meeting), and the 
financial crisis dummy variable are significantly associated 
with HRD.
Table 3  Mean disclosure score value for individual HRD item for each financial year and for the overall sample
HRD items Mean 
score 
overall
Mean score 2005 Mean score 2006 Mean score 2007 Mean score 2008 Mean score 2009
Procedural HRD
 Employee health and safety 3.619 3.343 3.475 3.550 3.674 3.939
 Employee diversity and equity 
issues
3.457 3.057 3.350 3.700 3.370 3.714
 HR section and HR functions 3.576 2.943 3.575 4.075 3.544 3.653
 Employee numbers 3.729 3.400 3.575 3.8 3.761 4.000
 Employee welfare and benefit 3.300 2.600 3.000 3.425 3.544 3.714
 Employee appreciation 2.948 2.743 3.100 3.350 2.544 3.020
 Employee satisfaction and loyalty 2.705 2.314 2.55 2.825 2.804 2.918
 Employee motivation 1.957 1.771 1.95 1.900 1.957 2.143
 Employee featured 1.791 1.800 1.725 1.700 1.848 1.857
 HR director committee 0.891 0.429 0.725 0.975 0.913 1.265
Sustainable HRD
 Employee involvement/engagement 3.848 3.314 3.975 4.025 3.870 3.959
 Work environment and culture of 
employees
3.895 3.629 4.000 4.100 3.717 4.000
 Employee expenses and pension 3.681 3.571 3.725 3.350 3.826 3.857
 Employee training programme 3.586 3.257 3.475 3.700 3.435 3.959
 Employee compensation plan 
including share schemes
3.500 2.943 3.450 3.675 3.587 3.714
 Employee know-how and compe-
tency
3.467 2.829 3.550 3.600 3.544 3.674
 Education and vocational qualifica-
tion
2.495 2.371 2.675 2.775 2.217 2.469
 Employee experience 2.767 2.629 2.525 2.85 2.522 3.225
 Value-added strategy 3.267 2.714 3.225 3.35 3.196 3.694
 Career development 3.310 2.571 3.35 3.525 3.326 3.612
 Value-added/revenue per employee 0.510 0.514 0.575 0.425 0.435 0.591
 Entrepreneurial spirit and innova-
tion
2.048 2.057 2.050 2.125 2.087 1.939
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Discussion
In the current study, we consider HRD in isolation from 
other forms of disclosures (e.g. intellectual capital) 
(Abeysekera 2010; An et al. 2011; Li et al. 2008, 2012), 
and we examine firm-level HRD practice at the time of 
UK reforms that aimed to foster higher levels of corpo-
rate accountability regarding HR practices (CIPD 2017; 
McCracken et al. 2018). Researchers have observed that 
there is a significant improvement in HRD over time, par-
ticularly in terms of the sustainable HR items (DTI 2003a, 
b; Roslender and Stevenson 2009). Distinctively, we have 
also established that a company’s employee relation ideol-
ogy is associated with HRD.
Furthermore, the unitarist employee relation ideology 
claim of a supportive relationship between employees and 
employers leading to more comprehensive, transparent, and 
uniform HRD that reflects a mutual engagement between 
key stakeholders is evidenced/confirmed by the firms’ adop-
tion of higher levels of substantive HRD (Brown 2000; Ash-
forth and Gibbs 1990). The significant positive association 
established through the current empirical analysis holds and 
supports this proposition; however, the level of disclosure 
in relation to all individual HRD items suggests that there is 
still room for significant improvement in practice.
A comparison of the findings with previous empirical 
studies revealed mixed implications. In certain instances, 
the findings offer support for the previous empirical evi-
dence (Subbarao and Zeghal 1997); however, there were 
also contradictory results for a range of different reasons. 
The most substantively disclosed items in the current study 
(such as employee benefit, employee numbers, and HRM 
and function-related information) and the least substantively 
disclosed items (such as HR director involvement and HR 
director committee) were recognised in a similar manner 
by Subbarao and Zeghal (1997). The progressive improve-
ment in HRD from symbolic to substantive revealed that the 
levels of disclosure for HR investment-related items have 
increased since 1996, providing a comprehensive picture 
on items recognised as most reported in the UK context. 
However, even though the frequency and the text size/vol-
ume were higher for some items, such as employee apprecia-
tion and employee motivation, the comprehensive nature of 
the disclosures relating to them had not visibly improved. 
These findings imply that the financial reports have tended 
to consider procedural HRD items at the symbolic compli-
ance level when compared with substantively reported HR 
sustainable-related items; thus evidence of an instrumental 
stakeholder management strategy at play is combined with 
an attempt to maintain moral legitimacy.
As an example, the disclosure of employee contribution 
to the firm’s value added has not been disclosed by UK firms 
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since 1993/1994 (Subbarao and Zeghal 1997). In spite of it 
being categorised as sustainable HR-related disclosure, the 
results indicate that only a handful of firms have reported 
this item in their annual reports. Confirming this previous 
evidence of intentional exclusions (Burchell et al. 1985), 
out of 210 annual reports in the study, 158 reports did not 
have any information on employee contribution to firm value 
added, and only three reports out of 210 appear to have sub-
stantive disclosure practices (i.e. reporting on all of the five 
levels). Whilst higher employee contribution to firm value 
creation is recognised as a sustainable business practice 
(Vithana et al. 2018), the exclusion of the value-added infor-
mation was deemed intentional (Burchell et al. 1985) as a 
means to avoid this information falling in the hands of trade 
unions. Arguably, the instrumental stakeholder perspective 
supports the view that companies may also seek to “man-
age” stakeholders by avoiding the disclosure of informa-
tion deemed to be sensitive in the management of employee 
relations. There has been an increasing recognition of some 
aspects, such as health and safety, employee diversity and 
equity issues. Companies evidently appear to be seeking to 
achieve consequential and processual legitimacy as a result 
of the existing regulatory framework on health and safety, 
equal employment opportunity, and diversity related aspects 
(Adams and Harte 2000). This offers support for the findings 
of the ACCA (2009) study on HRD in annual reports.
tsaelottsom:eulaverusolcsidnaeMseirogetacxedniDRH disclosure Most to least substantive disclosure by firms  
sbuSserusolcsidtsoMdetaler-tnemtsevniRH tantive disclosure by most % of firms 
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Fig. 3  Comparative presentation: HRD index categories, mean disclosure value categories and substantive/symbolic disclosure categories
Table 5  Overall HRD index 
value trend in comparison with 
procedural and sustainable HRD 
indices
The disclosure indices are calculated as the ratio between the summation of the actual disclosure scores for 
all the items considered under a particular index (22 items for HRD index, 10 items for Procedural HRD 
index and 12 items for Sustainable HRD index) and the summation of the ideal substantive disclosure for 
all the items considered under a particular index (5*22 for HRD index, 5*10 for Procedural HRD index 
and 5*12 for Sustainable HRD index). The value ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the value of the index, the 
more substantive the HRD is
Variable Statistics Overall sample 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
HRD index (ratio) Mean 0.585 0.516 0.578 0.607 0.579 0.627
St Dev 0.147 0.148 0.135 0.136 0.154 0.145
Procedural HRD index (ratio) Mean 0.560 0.488 0.541 0.586 0.559 0.605
St Dev 0.138 0.134 0.129 0.121 0.145 0.136
Sustainable HRD index (ratio) Mean 0.606 0.540 0.609 0.625 0.596 0.645
St Dev 0.174 0.174 0.159 0.168 0.185 0.167
Human Resource Disclosures in UK Corporate Annual Reports: To What Extent Do These Reflect…
1 3
Ta
bl
e 
6 
 C
or
re
lat
io
n m
atr
ix
Fi
rm
 si
ze
In
du
str
y t
yp
e
Va
lu
e-
ad
de
d p
er
 
hu
m
an
 ca
pi
tal
Bo
ar
d s
ize
Au
di
t c
om
-
m
itt
ee
 si
ze
No
m
in
ati
on
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
siz
e
Re
m
un
er
ati
on
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 si
ze
Bo
ar
d i
nd
ep
en
d-
en
ce
Au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
m
ee
tin
gs
Re
m
un
er
ati
on
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
ee
t-
in
gs
Fi
rm
 si
ze
1
In
du
str
y t
yp
e
− 
0.0
18
1
Va
lu
e-
ad
de
d p
er
 
hu
m
an
 ca
pi
tal
0.3
34
*
0.2
15
*
1
Bo
ar
d s
ize
0.4
86
*
0.2
61
*
0.1
88
*
1
Au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
siz
e
0.2
25
*
0.0
54
0.1
23
0.2
63
*
1
No
m
in
ati
on
 co
m
-
m
itt
ee
 si
ze
− 
0.2
36
*
0.0
07
− 
0.2
8*
− 
0.0
76
0.2
26
*
1
Re
m
un
er
ati
on
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 si
ze
0.1
13
0.0
16
0.0
21
0.0
98
0.5
26
*
0.3
98
*
1
Bo
ar
d i
nd
ep
en
d-
en
ce
0.1
73
*
− 
0.1
16
0.0
54
0.0
01
0.1
47
*
− 
0.1
32
− 
0.1
70
*
1
Au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
m
ee
tin
gs
0.1
97
*
0.4
09
*
0.1
40
*
0.4
40
*
0.2
09
*
− 
0.2
09
*
0.0
52
0.0
88
1
Re
m
un
er
ati
on
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
ee
t-
in
gs
0.0
31
0.1
39
*
− 
0.1
90
*
0.2
20
*
0.0
50
0.0
24
0.0
57
− 
0.1
00
0.3
64
*
1
No
m
in
ati
on
 co
m
-
m
itt
ee
 m
ee
tin
gs
0.1
26
0.0
62
0.0
03
0.1
28
0.0
50
− 
0.1
36
− 
0.0
38
0.0
51
0.3
25
*
0.2
76
*
Fi
rm
 le
ve
ra
ge
− 
0.1
18
0.6
98
*
− 
0.0
09
0.1
97
*
0.0
12
0.1
84
*
0.1
01
− 
0.3
47
*
0.2
32
*
0.1
95
*
Fi
rm
 pr
ofi
tab
ili
ty
.21
1*
− 
0.3
13
*
0.3
28
*
− 
0.0
63
0.0
76
− 
0.0
72
0.0
55
− 
0.0
04
− 
0.0
59
− 
0.1
18
Fi
rm
 li
qu
id
ity
0.0
53
− 
0.0
94
0.1
16
− 
0.0
22
0.0
95
− 
0.1
68
*
0.0
25
0.1
38
*
0.1
01
− 
0.1
32
Em
pl
oy
ee
 pr
od
uc
-
tiv
ity
0.3
93
*
− 
0.0
02
0.7
58
*
0.0
75
0.1
12
− 
0.3
75
*
0.0
40
0.1
23
0.1
42
*
− 
0.1
87
*
Un
ita
ris
t e
m
pl
oy
ee
 
re
lat
io
n
0.2
01
*
− 
0.0
45
0.1
48
*
0.1
83
*
0.0
45
− 
0.0
18
0.0
06
0.1
82
*
− 
0.0
64
− 
0.0
92
Fi
na
nc
ial
 cr
isi
s
− 
0.2
09
*
− 
0.1
05
− 
0.2
80
*
− 
0.2
41
*
− 
0.1
04
− 
0.0
08
− 
0.0
67
0.1
14
− 
0.0
45
0.0
81
HR
D
− 
0.0
83
− 
0.1
11
− 
0.1
25
0.0
82
− 
0.0
16
− 
0.0
67
0.0
07
− 
0.1
76
*
0.0
54
0.1
41
*
Pr
oc
ed
ur
al 
HR
D
0.0
14
− 
0.1
99
*
− 
0.1
04
0.0
65
− 
0.0
94
− 
0.1
00
− 
0.0
58
− 
0.0
97
− 
0.0
09
0.0
89
Su
sta
in
ab
le 
RH
D
− 
0.1
55
*
− 
0.0
45
− 
0.1
26
0.0
67
0.0
27
− 
0.0
36
0.0
52
− 
0.2
07
*
0.0
77
0.1
58
*
No
m
in
ati
on
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
ee
tin
gs
Fi
rm
 le
ve
ra
ge
Fi
rm
 pr
ofi
tab
ili
ty
Fi
rm
 li
qu
id
ity
Em
pl
oy
ee
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
-
ity
Un
ita
ris
t 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
re
lat
io
n
Fi
na
nc
ial
 cr
isi
s
HR
D
Pr
oc
ed
ur
al 
HR
D
Su
sta
in
ab
le 
HR
D
Fi
rm
 si
ze
In
du
str
y t
yp
e
 K. Vithana et al.
1 3
*S
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t .
05
 le
ve
l o
f s
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
Ta
bl
e 
6 
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
No
m
in
ati
on
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 
m
ee
tin
gs
Fi
rm
 le
ve
ra
ge
Fi
rm
 pr
ofi
tab
ili
ty
Fi
rm
 li
qu
id
ity
Em
pl
oy
ee
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
-
ity
Un
ita
ris
t 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
re
lat
io
n
Fi
na
nc
ial
 cr
isi
s
HR
D
Pr
oc
ed
ur
al 
HR
D
Su
sta
in
ab
le 
HR
D
Va
lu
e-
ad
de
d p
er
 
hu
m
an
 ca
pi
tal
Bo
ar
d s
ize
Au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
siz
e
No
m
in
ati
on
 co
m
-
m
itt
ee
 si
ze
Re
m
un
er
ati
on
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 si
ze
Bo
ar
d i
nd
ep
en
d-
en
ce
Au
di
t c
om
m
itt
ee
 
m
ee
tin
gs
Re
m
un
er
ati
on
 
co
m
m
itt
ee
 m
ee
t-
in
gs
No
m
in
ati
on
 co
m
-
m
itt
ee
 m
ee
tin
gs
1
Fi
rm
 le
ve
ra
ge
0.1
36
1
Fi
rm
 pr
ofi
tab
ili
ty
0.0
80
− 
0.0
48
1
Fi
rm
 li
qu
id
ity
0.0
09
− 
0.1
68
*
0.1
40
*
1
Em
pl
oy
ee
 pr
od
uc
-
tiv
ity
0.0
60
− 
0.1
37
0.5
15
*
0.1
86
*
1
Un
ita
ris
t e
m
pl
oy
ee
 
re
lat
io
n
0.0
35
− 
0.1
11
0.0
21
0.0
51
0.0
80
1
Fi
na
nc
ial
 cr
isi
s
0.0
98
− 
0.0
40
− 
0.3
01
*
− 
0.0
04
− 
0.1
7*
− 
0.0
13
1
HR
D
0.1
10
− 
0.0
33
− 
0.0
16
0.0
73
− 
0.0
98
0.1
00
0.1
12
1
Pr
oc
ed
ur
al 
HR
D
0.1
00
− 
0.1
39
*
− 
0.0
71
0.0
94
− 
0.0
72
0.1
19
0.1
5*
0.8
96
*
1
Su
sta
in
ab
le 
RH
D
0.0
97
0.0
34
0.0
06
0.0
53
− 
0.1
20
0.0
68
0.0
85
0.9
60
*
0.7
44
*
1
Human Resource Disclosures in UK Corporate Annual Reports: To What Extent Do These Reflect…
1 3
A comparison of the results with the previous empirical 
evidence reveals that there are many unrecognised items (i.e. 
in relation to the UK) (Li et al. 2008) and in a developing 
economy context (Abeysekera 2008). As an example, HRD 
items directly related to the employee development, such as 
educational and vocational qualifications, entrepreneurial 
spirit and innovations, and employee motivation, repre-
sent the foundation upon which a firm’s investment in HC 
Table 7  Results of multiple 
regression analysis with fixed-
effects
Firm size is measured as the natural log of market capitalization in £millions; firm leverage is the ratio 
between total debt to total equity; firm profitability is measured as the return on equity; the intellectual cap-
ital intensity is measured as the value added per human capital or the ratio between the total value added 
and the human resource expenditure; and employee productivity is the ratio between the net income before 
minority interest divided by the number of employees
***Significant at 0.01 level of significance; **significant at 0.05 level of significance; *significant at 0.10 
level of significance
Variable Human resource 
disclosure
Procedural HRD Sustainable HRD
Constant 0.209
(0.324)
0.168
(0.319)
0.245
(0.393)
Firm-specific variables
 Firm size (£Mn) 0.080
(0.066)
0.099
(0.065
0.063
(0.080)
 Firm leverage 0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
 Firm profitability 0.0002
(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.001)
 Firm liquidity 0.022
(0.025)
0.0095
(0.024)
0.033
(0.030)
 Value-added per human capital 0.009
(0.009)
0.012
(0.0097)
0.077
(0.012)
 Employee productivity − 0.081
(0.235)
− 0.171
(0.232)
− 0.005
(0.285)
Crisis dummy
 Financial crisis dummy 0.018
(0.019)
0.031*
(0.019)
0.007
(0.023)
Corporate governance variables
 Board size 0.002
(0.007)
0.0001
(0.007)
0.004
(0.008)
 Audit committee size − 0.014
(0.011)
− 0.026**
(0.011)
− 0.004
(0.013)
 Nomination committee size − 0.004
(0.009)
0.002
(0.008)
− 0.009
(0.010)
 Remuneration committee size − 0.008
(0.013)
− 0.009
(0.013)
− 0.007
(0.016)
 Board independence − 0.030
(0.171)
0.063
(0.168)
− 0.107
(0.207)
 Audit committee meetings 0.002
(0.009)
− 0.010
(0.009)
0.012
(0.011)
 Remuneration committee meetings 0.003
(0.005)
0.004
(0.005)
0.003
(0.007)
 Nomination committee meetings 0.004
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
0.006
(0.005)
Employee relation ideology status
 Unitarist employee relation 0.022**
(0.007)
0.017**
(0.007)
0.026***
(0.009)
 Year-effects Yes Yes Yes
 Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
 R2 0.012 0.0112 0.0107
 Sample size 203 203 203
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is built. Therefore, a symbolic or low recognition of these 
elements implies an inadequate consideration of longer-
term human resource investment. At the same time, these 
variations in the findings could be attributable to the dif-
ferences in the content analysis frameworks used to capture 
HRD, and in particular, previous studies focused more on 
the frequency rather than the depth of the reported informa-
tion (McCracken et al. 2018). Hence, reporting may have 
been more symbolic than substantive and yet scored higher 
in terms of the frequency or the sentence count, which we 
address in this paper. The findings indicate that, on the one 
hand, HRD items relating to the direct investment in human 
resources (such as employee education, experience, training 
and development), and HRD items relating to the final out-
come of this investment (such as employee value added), and 
other financial attributes related to HRM (such as revenue/
Table 8  Results of multiple 
regression analysis with 
random-effects
Firm size is measured as the natural log of market capitalization in £ millions; firm leverage is the ratio 
between total debt to total equity; firm profitability is measured as the return on equity; the intellectual cap-
ital intensity is measured as the value added per human capital or the ratio between the total value added 
and the human resource expenditure; and employee productivity is the ratio between the net income before 
minority interest divided by the number of employees
***Significant at 0.01 level of significance; **significant at 0.05 level of significance; *significant at 0.10 
level of significance
Variable Human resource 
disclosure
Procedural HRD Sustainable HRD
Constant 0.806***
(0.185)
0.606***
(0.177)
0.996***
(0.218)
Firm size (£Mn) − 0.022
(0.041)
0.029
(0.039)
− 0.069
(0.048)
Industry type − 0.056
(0.047)
− 0.090**
(0.045)
− 0.026
(0.055)
Firm leverage − 0.0001
(0.001)
0.0003
(0.001)
− 0.001
(0.001)
Firm profitability 0.0002
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0004)
0.0003
(0.0004)
Firm liquidity 0.030*
(0.017)
0.022
(0.017)
0.039*
(0.021)
Value-added per human capital 0.002
(0.005)
0.002
(0.005)
0.001
(0.006)
Employee productivity − 0.028
(0.172)
− 0.033
0.166
− 0.024
(0.203)
Financial crisis dummy 0.024
(0.017)
0.032*
(0.018)
0.017
(0.021)
Board size 0.004
(0.005)
0.002
(0.005)
0.006
(0.006)
Audit committee size − 0.010
(0.010)
− 0.021**
(0.010)
− 0.001
(0.012)
Nomination committee size − 0.004
(0.007)
− 0.001
(0.007)
− 0.007
(0.008)
Remuneration committee size − 0.001
(0.011)
− 0.003
(.011)
0.0004
(0.013)
Board independence − 0.293**
(0.123)
− 0.216*
(0.119)
− 0.377***
(0.145)
Audit committee meetings 0.000
(0.006)
− 0.002
(0.006)
0.001
(0.007)
Remuneration committee meetings 0.005
(0.005)
0.003
(0.005)
0.007
(0.006)
Nomination committee meetings 0.004
(0.004)
0.003
(0.004)
0.005
(0.005)
Unitarist employee relation 0.019***
(0.006)
0.016***
(0.006)
0.021***
(0.008)
R2 0.1399 0.1333 0.1564
Sample size 203 203 203
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profit per employee, and employee share and share option 
schemes, among others), were among the least reported 
items. On the other hand, procedural HRD items, relating to 
the organisational HR function, such as employee numbers, 
HR section and HR function, and employee diversity and 
equity, were among the most reported. In some ways, this 
reveals that in terms of HRDs, firms have taken a less than 
fully comprehensive approach.
Conclusion
Our research questions focused on (i) exploring the specific 
practice of sustainable and procedural corporate HRD in 
the wake of HRD reforms that have been pursued in the UK 
context, and (ii) the extent to which HRD is associated with 
the company’s employee relation ideology (unitarist versus 
non-unitarist–pluralist/radicalist ideology), as a reflection 
Table 9  Results of multiple 
regression analysis with pooled-
linear regression
Firm size is measured as the natural log of market capitalization in £ millions; firm leverage is the ratio 
between total debt to total equity; firm profitability is measured as the return on equity; the intellectual cap-
ital intensity is measured as the value added per human capital or the ratio between the total value added 
and the human resource expenditure; and employee productivity is the ratio between the net income before 
minority interest divided by the number of employees
***Significant at 0.01 level of significance; **significant at 0.05 level of significance; *significant at 0.10 
level of significance
Variable Human resource 
disclosure
Procedural HRD Sustainable HRD
Constant 0.890***
(0.138)
0.693***
(0.140)
1.05***
(0.164)
Firm size (£Mn) − 0.063**
(0.031)
− .006
(0.030)
− 0.112***
(0.035)
Industry type − 0.028
(0.038)
− 0.062*
(0.034)
− 0.001
(0.047)
Firm leverage − 0.001
(0.0009)
− 0.001
(0.001)
− 0.002
(0.001)
Firm profitability − 0.0001
(0.0004)
− 0.001
(0.0004)
0.0002
(0.0005)
Firm liquidity 0.053***
(0.014)
0.045***
(0.013)
0.060***
(0.017)
Value-added per human capital 0.0003
(0.004)
0.001
(0.005)
0.00003
(0.004)
Employee productivity − 0.051
(0.142)
− 0.039
(0.133)
− 0.061
(0.167)
Financial crisis dummy 0.035
(0.023)
0.039*
(0.022)
0.032
(0.026)
Board size 0.013***
(0.004)
0.009**
(0.004)
0.015***
(0.005)
Audit committee size 0.002
(0.013)
− 0.005
(0.012)
0.008
(0.015)
Nomination committee size − 0.008
(0.006)
− 0.006
(0.006)
− 0.010
(0.007)
Remuneration committee size 0.005
(0.013)
− 0.002
(0.012)
0.010
(0.016)
Board independence − 0.412***
(0.122)
− .343***
(.118)
− 0.470***
(0.139)
Audit committee meetings − 0.005
(0.005)
− 0.002
(0.004)
− 0.007
(0.007)
Remuneration committee meetings 0.008
(0.005)
0.004
(0.005)
0.012**
(0.006)
Nomination committee meetings 0.008**
(0.004)
0.007*
(0.004)
0.009**
(0.0045)
Unitarist employee relation 0.012*
(0.007)
0.011*
(0.006)
0.013*
(0.0078)
R2 0.2005 0.2005 0.1988
Sample size 203 203 203
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of managerial/organisational intention towards employees. 
We argue that HRD is motivated by a theoretical frame that 
is bound by instrumental stakeholder theory and salience, 
together with the tenets of moral legitimacy (consequential 
and processual forms). Our main findings are thus twofold. 
First, our results suggest that HRDs have become more sub-
stantive over time in terms of providing more in-depth and 
coherent forms of disclosure, although selective reporting 
remains. Second, we show that a more unitarist employee 
relation ideology leads to a comprehensive form of HRDs.
This study seeks to contribute to the extant literature in 
several ways. First, we provide evidence of UK HRD prac-
tice in the aftermath of a notable reform and the disposi-
tion (and potential) of corporate entities towards the human 
capital agenda—an issue which is crucial in a number of 
contemporary reporting models (e.g. Global Reporting Ini-
tiative; Integrated Reporting; UN Sustainable Development 
Goals) and has renewed calls for human resource account-
ing (CIPD 2015). Second, the disclosure index developed 
in the paper provides a methodological tool to assess HRD 
practice in different settings that is sufficiently detailed and 
separate from the mainstream notions of IC to enable a more 
focused assessment of a firm’s disposition towards HRD.
The methodology of the current study is novel in 
terms of designing an index to capture both the depth and 
breadth of the HRD practice, which is an improvement to 
the usual dichotomous scoring adopted in the larger HRD/
IC literature (e.g. McCracken et al. 2018; Day and Wood-
ward 2004). This method has ensured that comprehensive 
HRD practices are appropriately captured. An in-depth 
analysis of the depth and breadth of HRD also concludes 
that not all the HRD items appear to be substantively dis-
closed, owing to a strategic approach that is either con-
cerned about the impact of stakeholder salience and/or by 
the perception that companies are not sufficiently respond-
ing to societal expectations about the status of employees 
in the UK context of instrumental stakeholder and moral 
legitimacy. But, there are still important HRD items that 
are not well recognised (i.e. the stagnant HRD scores relat-
ing to value added per employee).
There are two related ethical implications arising from the 
HRD findings. Voluntary disclosure behaviours framed by the 
instrumental stakeholder, and stakeholder salience and moral 
legitimacy perspectives suggest that the disclosure process 
continues to reflect a largely unilateral, managerial-led, pro-
cess, arguably with a relatively limited level of ethical concern 
about the nature of the relationship expressed in the disclo-
sure. In effect, the moral pluralism and logics that have been 
seen to characterise accounting practice in general (e.g. Baud 
et al. 2019) could very well apply to the case of how social 
reporting (such as HRD) is approached by the organisation. At 
the same time, we refrain from recommending “mandatory” 
forms of HRD, since we do not believe there is a case that 
compliance with particular pre-determined standards of dis-
closure will adequately address the aspirations inherent to the 
ethical variant of stakeholder theory. Instead, we would sug-
gest that HRD scholars and practitioners consider more explic-
itly the notion of the “ethics of care” (Gilligan 1982; Reiter 
1996) and the principles (Reiter 1996, p. 39) of “individuals 
as interdependent,” “relationships of attention and response,” 
“care as strength,” “importance of interpendence and inter-
personal connections,” and “needs of others as important.”. 
In the context of the crucial relationship with employees, we 
would argue that the above could be important guiding princi-
ples for HR and HRD practices, which could complement—if 
not transcend—the largely individualistic-, contractual- and 
economic-led forms of corporate communication.
In terms of limitations, the current study includes a limited 
sample size, and there is the possibility of self-selection bias, 
since firms which did not disclose human resource expendi-
ture (in order for us to calculate value added) were excluded 
from the sample. The findings may also be affected by addi-
tional firm-level factors such as political costs, thus warrant-
ing further research. Further studies with a larger sample size 
for a longer duration and a standardised HRD framework 
developed through computer aided content analyses tech-
nique and/or factor analysis may offer new insights that our 
current study has not been able to offer. Similarly, as with all 
archival studies of this nature, our measure and variables for 
HRD, governance, employee ideologies, and firm character-
istics may or may not reflect practice. In-depth case studies 
may therefore offer insights about the processes underlying 
reporting and disclosure decisions, for example by conducting 
interviews of relevant actors e.g. employees, HR practitioners, 
managers, investors, labour unions, and governments.
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